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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the successful rural water systems in the municipality of
Baybay, the Philippines. The literature generally agrees that rural communities should
be more involved and assume more responsibility to make rural water systems
successful. The case of Baybay offers an example of such success. This thesis asks two
questions. First, how are the rural water systems developed and maintained in Baybay?
Second, what conditions induce good performance of these communities?
There exists a paradox in the ways the rural water systems are developed and
maintained in Baybay. Donor agencies usually propose to levy user fees on rural
residents to induce them to make informed decisions about whether they need the
planned water facilities, and to regulate the water operators' maintenance performance.
Most rural communities in Baybay, however, do not charge user fees.
From the findings in 36 rural communities in Baybay, this thesis discusses how
what I call "political institutions" contribute to inducing rural communities' decision
making and to regulating water operators, despite the absence of user fees. These
political institutions are the popularly elected community councils and their interactions
with municipal elite.
This thesis also identifies the conditions which enable the political institutions to
work and make good performance of rural water systems possible in Baybay. These
conditions include the abundance of spring water in Baybay, the effects of the
decentralization policy of the Philippine national government, the organizational
structure of community councils, and local prestige and influence enjoyed by the
municipal officials.
Finally, the thesis draws a few policy implications from this case study concerning
both community-based rural water projects particularly and decentralization of public
services generally.
Thesis Supervisor: Paul Smoke
Title: Associate Professor of Political Economy and Planning
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Water supply projects for rural communities in most developing countries have
suffered from inadequate maintenance. Installed water supply systems have frequently
broken down and remained in disrepair. In some cases, rural residents do not use newly
constructed water facilities and prefer traditional water sources. Evaluation of rural
water projects report abundant failures. For example, Churchill et al. (1987) describes
that "in country after country [rural water] systems are going out of operation almost as
fast as they are being built" (p.3).
The literature has increasingly focused on the issue of sustainable use and
maintenance of rural drinking water facilities in developing countries since the late
1980's, when some seminal works emerged on this issue (Churchill et al. 1987, Briscoes
and de Ferranti 1988, Kleemeier 1988, Therkildsen 1988). These works attributed the
failure of past rural water policy primarily to the negligence of communities.
Government agencies provided water facilities without fully consulting with rural
residents. As a result, the facilities did not meet the residents' demands. The existing
literature on rural water generally agrees that rural communities should be more involved
and assume more responsibility in development and maintenance of water systems. The
issue remains, however, about how rural communities should be involved and what
conditions induce good performance from these communities.
This thesis examines successful rural water systems in the municipality of Baybay,
the Philippines. In Baybay, rural communities are deeply involved in the development
and maintenance of water systems. Consequently, the rural residents in Baybay use and
maintain their water systems well. This thesis asks two primary questions. First, how
are the rural water systems developed and maintained in Baybay? The thesis specifically
deals with how the rural communities are involved. Second, what conditions induce
good performance of these water systems?
1.1. How Are the Water Systems Developed and Maintained?
I found a paradox in the ways the systems are developed and maintained in
Baybay. Donor agencies usually propose to levy user fees on residents to encourage
sustainable use and maintenance of rural water systems.' Most rural communities in
Baybay, however, do not charge user fees.
User fees are expected to address the following two considerations for rural water
systems. First, water facilities must reflect the demands of rural communities. Residents
do not use and maintain the water facilities unless these facilities are appropriate to their
needs. It is expected that charging user fees induces rural communities to make
informed decisions about whether the planned water facilities reflect their demands.
Second, there must be a monitoring mechanism for the performance of those who
maintain water facilities. Without such a mechanism, they do not properly maintain the
I A recent example can be found in Katz and Sara (1997, pp.5-6). They are concerned with the first
consideration to user fees in my discussion.
facilities. Charging user fees makes water operators dependent on users' payments for
their salaries and therefore stimulates the operators' good maintenance performance.
Most rural communities in Baybay, however, do not levy user fees on their
residents. What is an alternative mechanism in Baybay to reflect the communities'
demands and to regulate the water operators' maintenance performance? As elaborated
in the third chapter, my findings from 36 rural communities in Baybay indicate that
''political institutions," the popularly elected community councils and their interactions
with the municipal elite, contribute to the sustained use and maintenance of water
facilities. First, the community councilors take the initiative in planning their water
systems and lobby the municipal politicians for these systems.2 Consequently, the water
systems reflect the demands of the communities. Second, each community council
assigns one councilor to maintain its water system. The councilor maintains the system
well because the maintenance performance affects his or her chance of reelection. I also
found that technical help from the municipal engineers and friendly relations with them
are crucial for the rural communities. Despite the absence of user fees, these political
institutions contribute to reflecting communities' demands and to regulating water
operators' maintenance performance.
1.2. What Are the Conditions for Good Performance?
Finding the function of the political institutions leads to the second question of this
2 Municipalities are divided into communities, locally called barangays in the Philippines. The
municipality of Baybay consists of 92 barangays. All municipalities and communities have their own
popularly elected councils. See Chapter 2 for more details about the local government system in the
thesis: what conditions enable these political institutions to work in Baybay? This
question is important because such mechanisms rarely seem to work as well as they do
in the case of Baybay. The thesis specifically asks the following four questions.
First, why is the municipal elite in Baybay not an obstacle for the rural
communities in taking the initiative to develop water facilities? Local elite often
obstructs the development initiative of the communities to serve their own personal
interests rather than these communities' interests. Steffes (1997), for example, shows
that private contractors and municipal politicians take over the planning stage of rural
water facilities for communities in Brazil and Ecuador.3 Similarly, local politics in the
Philippines are often portrayed as dominated by local elite.4
Second, what enables the rural communities in Baybay to take the initiative in
developing water systems? Some authors rhetorically advocate that "the community
itself must be the primary decision maker" (Briscoe and de Ferranti 1988, p.1). Their
emphasis, however, is on the providers of water systems. The literature focuses on how
the water providers can involve communities in deciding the type of water systems or
how the providers can take communities' preferences into account. Rural communities
seldom take the initiative by themselves.
Philippines.
Another example is Serrano (1996). He also shows how outsiders, such as the state government, local
politicians, and private firms, influence the communities' decision-making in a demand-driven program in
the state of Ceari in Brazil.
4 Local politicians in the Philippines, though popularly elected, are often alleged not to serve their
constituency but to pursue their own interests. For example, Hutchcroft (1991) illustrates that the
Philippine political economy is dominated by oligarchs and cronies who abuse resources of the weak state
apparatus for their own interests. He points out that this illustration is also applicable to local politics in
the Philippines (p.450).
Third, what makes the election of rural community councilors in Baybay an
effective performance-monitoring mechanism? Elected councilors are not necessarily
accountable to the residents. They may respond only to the powerful constituents in
their communities. In such a case, many parts of the community may be left unserved by
adequate public services. Dillinger (1995) points out that "even in countries with well-
established electoral processes, supplementary measures are typically needed....
Moreover, the view that local elections always perform well in this role [to hold elected
politicians accountable] does not stand up to scrutiny" (p.64).
Fourth, why do the municipal engineers in Baybay wish to work for the municipal
government? Many local governments in developing countries suffer from the lack of
technically capable personnel. Since more lucrative jobs are often available outside,
skilled engineers seldom choose to work for the municipal government.
This thesis illuminates the abundance of spring water, the effect of the
decentralization policy, the organizational structure of community councils, and the local
prestige enjoyed by the municipal officials, as conditions for successful performance of
the rural water systems in Baybay.
1.3. Organization of Thesis
The next chapter briefly describes the background of rural water systems in Baybay
and the methodology applied in this research. The third chapter describes how rural
communities in Baybay develop and maintain water facilities. It illustrates the function
of what I call the political institutions. The fourth chapter aims to explain what
conditions enable these political institutions to work in Baybay. It specifically answers
the four questions raised in this chapter. The last chapter concludes my argument by
providing a few policy implications derived from the case of Baybay.
CHAPTER 2
CASE AND METHODS
2.1. The Case: The Municipality of Baybay'
The municipality of Baybay is a large rural town, with a land area of 460.5 square
kilometers, located along the west coast of the Leyte province in the Eastern Visayas
Region, which is the second poorest region in the Philippines.6 Baybay has the largest
population (86,179 for 1995) among municipalities in the province.7 In spite of its
closeness to the sea, most of the land area in the municipality is mountainous. It has a
small urban center, locally called Poblacion, and many rural communities scattered over
the mountain (See Appendix for a map of Baybay). Its primary economic base is
agriculture, mainly the production of coconut and abaca. There is no big industrial
establishment, although there are a number of small business establishments, mostly
employing less than ten workers (Municipality of Baybay 1995).
Baybay municipal government consists of ten popularly elected officials (a mayor,
a vice mayor, and eight councilors) and approximately 200 employees. The municipality
5 Local governments of the Philippines consist of 77 provinces (first tier), 65 cities and 1,542
municipalities (second tier), and 41,926 communities, locally called barangays (third tier). Some cities,
called Highly Urbanized Cities, have equal status as provinces. All tiers of local governments have
popularly elected chief executives and councilors. The Philippines is also divided into 16 regions which
are administrative units of the national government (Brillantes Jr. 1996).
6 The island of Leyte is one of the major islands in the Philippines and is divided into two provinces, Leyte
and Southern Leyte. Leyte province consists of two cities and 41 municipalities. Leyte province is one of
the six provinces of the Eastern Visayas Region. In terms of per capita Regional Gross Domestic Product
in 1995, the Eastern Visayas Region is the second poorest region in the Philippines.
is further divided into 92 communities (with a median population of 142 households),
locally called barangays, each of which has eight popularly elected officials (a captain
and seven councilors).
As shown in Table 2.1, different organizations run urban and rural water systems
respectively in Baybay. Baybay Water District (BWD), a locally established water
corporation, constructs and maintains a large integrated urban water system, which
exclusively serves 23 barangays in the Poblacion and 14 barangays surrounding the
Poblacion. On the other hand, the municipal government is responsible for the
construction of water systems in 55 rural barangays, and respective rural barangays
maintain their own independent water systems. The focus of this thesis is these rural
water systems.
I chose the municipality of Baybay for my case study because Baybay was well
known in the Philippines as a municipality successfully providing drinking water
facilities to rural barangays. Baybay won the Galing Pook Award, a national award
annually given to 20 local governments that show excellent performance in public
administration, for its rural water projects in 1995.8 It was, in fact, the only local
government that won the award for rural water projects at the time of this field research.
The Philippines has been in the process of devolving responsibilities for rural drinking
water provision from the national government to local governments since the enactment
7 Two cities in the Leyte province, however, have larger populations than Baybay.
8 Galing Pook or Gantimpalang Pang-lingkod Pook awards (Excellence in Local Government Awards)
started in 1994. Programs of 20 awards-recipients are publicized in Innovations: Excellence in Local
Governance published by Local Government Academy of the Philippine national government each year.
Rural water projects of Baybay are included in its 1995 edition. For a brief introduction of Galing Pook
of the new Local Government Code of 1991. Most municipalities, however, have not
been able to assume the responsibilities due to insufficient technical and financial
capabilities. Baybay is among a few successful municipalities. The ratio of rural
population having access to potable water in Baybay slightly exceeds the national
average (Table 2.1).
TABLE 2.1.
Water Systems in Baybay
Urban Rural
Access to Potable Water a in 1996 b 91% 79%
(National Average in 1995) C (61%) d (70%)e
Barangays Served 23 urban &14 outskirts 55
Population 36,633 49,546
Median # of Households per Barangay 152 138
Organization in charge of Capital Investment Baybay Water District Municipal Government
(BWD)
Organization in charge of O&M Rural Barangays
Water Systems One large system Small independent systems in
covering all above respective barangays. Mostly
barangays (a gravity-fed gravity-fed systems from
system from protected protected springs. Most
springs). Mostly households use communal
household connections. faucets.
" % of population.
b Source: Household survey conducted by Human Ecological Security Office of the Municipality of
Baybay. In its questionnaire, access is defined as "access to potable water (faucet/deep well) within 250
meters (10 minutes walk)." For a few communities for which survey results are missing, estimates made
by sanitation inspectors, who regularly visit each barangay, at Rural Health Unit 1 and 2 of the
Municipality of Baybay, are used.
' Source: DILG (1997).
d Excluding Metro Manila, the capital of the Philippines.
eThese are mostly access to publicly-used wells (see Table 4.1) whereas figures in urban systems are
mostly access to individual household connections. Rural water facilities have been constructed by the
national Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). In Baybay, DPWH also constructed
deepwells in some rural barangays, but the municipality replaced most of them with gravity-fed systems
from springs.
2.2. Methodology
I conducted field research in the Philippines for two months, from July to August
awards, see Asian Institute of Management (1995).
1997. I spent six weeks in Baybay and two weeks in the national capital, Metro Manila.
During my six-week stay in Baybay, I spent four weeks visiting rural barangays to
observe their own water systems. In each barangay I interviewed at least one of the
elected officials (captain or councilor); walked around the community to observe its
water system including water intake tanks, reservoirs, distribution networks, and public
faucets; and interviewed people using public faucets elsewhere. I visited a total of 36
rural barangays out of 55.
In choosing the rural barangays visited, I tried to cover various types of barangays
to grasp a comprehensive and accurate picture of rural water systems in Baybay. I chose
the barangays using the three criteria: geographical characteristics, the ratio of
population having access to potable water, and the number of households per barangay.
I visited more barangays along national roads than those in the mountain because of
accessibility; nevertheless, I also covered the latter barangays fairly (Table 2.2). I
visited barangays from those having little access to potable water to those having
complete access (Table 2.3). My field visits cover all the sizes of barangays in terms of
the number of households (Table 2.4). Appendix, a map of Baybay, shows a
geographical distribution of the barangays visited.
TABLE 2.2.
Geographical Characteristics of the Barangays Visited
Total Number of Rural Number of Barangays
Barangays Visited
Along National Roads (Coastal Area) 14 12
Along National Roads (Mountainous Area) 9 9
Interior of the Mountain 32 15
Total 55 36
TABLE 2.3.
Access to Potable Water in the Barangays Visited
% of Population Having Access to Potable Total Number of Rural Number of Barangays
Water Barangays Visited
25% 6 3
26-50% 3 2
51-75% 10 7
76-100% 36 24
Total 55 36
Source: see note b of Table 2.1.
TABLE 2.4.
Number of Households in the Barangays Visited
Number of Households per Barangay Total Number of Rural Number of Barangays
Barangays Visited
100 22 9
101-200 16 12
201-300 9 7
301 -400 3 3
401 -500 2 2
501-600 0 0
601-700 2 2
701-800 1 1
Total 55 36
Source: NSO (1996).
In the remaining two weeks in Baybay, I conducted interviews at the municipal
government with the municipal mayor, the vice mayor, the municipal councilors, and the
employees of the various offices of the municipal government. In addition to these
interviews, I accompanied the municipal engineering staff as they assisted three
barangays one day and sat in on at the municipal council once. I also interviewed the
congressman elected from this municipality and the employees in the field offices of
various departments of the national government. Besides public officials, I interviewed
different people everywhere in the municipality, including local businessmen, bankers,
teachers, pastors, housewives and so on. Furthermore, I took part in several events in the
municipality, such as fiestas of two rural barangays. Such experience helped me
understand the social, economic, and political lives in the municipality and helped me
think about their implications for rural water projects. The details of the questions I
asked in the interviews are unfolded as my arguments are developed in the following
chapters.
During another two-week stay in Metro Manila, I interviewed the relevant officers
of some departments of the national government and several development assistance
agencies, such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, to gather
information about the overall picture of rural water supply facilities in the Philippines.
This information allows me to compare the case of Baybay with average situations of
rural drinking water provision in the Philippines.
CHAPTER 3
GOOD MAINTENANCE OF RURAL WATER SYSTEMS IN BAYBAY:
HOW DOES IT WORK?
This chapter describes how the rural water systems in Baybay are developed and
maintained, and how the rural communities there are involved. The first section details
the rural water systems in Baybay and its good performance. The second section
introduces a paradox. It shows that most rural communities in Baybay do not levy user
fees despite the fact that donor agencies propose to charge users to encourage good
performance of rural water systems. The following two sections describe an alternative
mechanism in Baybay to induce good performance. The third section details how the
rural water systems are developed. The fourth section elaborates how the systems are
maintained. The key institutions in this mechanism are the popularly elected rural
community councils and their interactions with the municipal elite, i.e. the municipal
politicians and engineers. The fifth section names these "political institutions."
3.1. Rural Water Systems in Baybay and Their Performance
The municipal government started its annual household survey in 1996 to gather
statistics regarding basic human needs, including access to potable water. The data in
1996, the only data available at the time of my visit, shows that the ratio of population
having access to potable water in 55 rural barangays is 79%. This figure slightly
exceeds the national average of 70% in 1995. The rural water systems in Baybay fairly
cover its rural population.9
Through my field visits to 36 rural barangays, I confirmed that these figures'
generally represent the current situation of the water facilities in the rural barangays of
Baybay," though I identified the need for modified interpretation for two barangays
among those I visited." Table 3.1 summarizes my findings in the field visits to 36
sample barangays. For barangays that I did not visit, I assume that the municipality's
data generally represents the current status of rural water facilities in these barangays.13
9 Table 2.3 in the previous chapter presents the distribution of different levels of access to potable water
across the rural barangays in Baybay.
10 These figures must be confirmed by field visits because there are some possible misrepresentations and
inaccuracies. For example, the water facilities were functioning at the time of the survey but may have
broken down since then. Some of the access to potable water is not access to the government-provided
water facilities but access to private water vendors. See Brookshire and Whittington (1993) for more
discussion of possible misrepresentations and inaccuracies in these figures regarding access to water.
I The best way to confirm the municipality's data is to conduct another household survey; however, due to
a limited time frame of my field research, I could not engage in such a survey. Instead, I confirmed the
accuracy of the municipality's figures through my observations on the water systems while walking around
each barangay and through my interviews with people in these barangays.
The first modification concerns the barangay Hilapnitan, which records 99% access in the
municipality's data. Water facilities in Hilapnitan broke down due to the typhoon in the late 1996 and
remained in disrepair at the time of my field visits. Hilapnitan was planning to develop new water
facilities and proposing the plan to the municipality. Hilapnitan is reclassified as "barangays with broken
systems" in Table 3.1. The other modification regards the barangay Can-Ipa, which records 51% access
in the municipality's data. In Can-Ipa, most people bought water from private vendors because a protected
spring in Can-Ipa produced little water and water from other sources, such as rivers, was contaminated.
My interviews at Can-Ipa revealed that the municipality's figure on Can-Ipa included access to water from
private vendors. Can-Ipa is reclassified as "barangays with no system or systems with little coverage" in
Table 3.1. Apart from these, my observations in other barangays were consistent with the municipality's
data.
13 There are two justifications for this assumption. First, the municipal government officials knew that the
water systems in Hilapnitan were broken, and they told me that there were no other rural water facilities
which were totally broken down. The rural barangays in Baybay report to the municipal government and
seek its assistance when major problems occur in their water facilities. If there were other barangays
whose systems broke down, the municipal officials must have known them. Second, there is little
possibility of the presence of private water vendors in these barangays because the vendors in Can-Ipa are
not professional water vendors but the residents of this barangay, and they fetch water by handcarts from
the households in the Poblacion where the Baybay Water District provides water. This is possible because
Can-Ipa is just a few minutes away from the Poblacion. All the barangays which I did not visit, however,
TABLE 3.1.
Maintenance Performance of Water Facilities in the Rural Barangays Visited
Number of Rural Barangays Visited 36
Barangays with Functioning Water Systems 31
Barangays with no system or systems with little coverage a 4
Barangays with broken systems b I
a Barangays with less than 25% access in the municipality's data plus barangay Can-Ipa.
b Barangay Hilapnitan.
What type of water systems do the rural barangays in Baybay use? Most
barangays use springs for their water sources and adopt gravity-fed distribution
networks (Table 3.2). Even in the two barangays that primarily use wells, my
interviewees told me that they also plan to develop gravity-fed systems using springs.
Indeed, many rural barangays relied on deepwells before, but they replaced them with
spring water systems (Table 3.3). Because of unacceptable quality of water,14 eleven
barangays abandoned their wells or used them only for non-drinking use, such as
washing and watering plants. In another six barangays, " rural residents prefer to use
spring water facilities because they perceive water from spring is better than that from
deepwells. They use deepwells only when spring water systems do not supply enough
water. Municipal officials told me that most barangays that I did not visit also use
gravity-fed systems from springs. On the whole, rural water facilities in Baybay are
gravity-fed systems from springs.
are quite far from the Poblacion. It is difficult for the residents of these barangays to engage in similar
water vending activities to those in Can-Ipa. Municipal government officials told me that they never heard
of residents in other barangays relying on water vending for their drinking water.
14 My interviewees in these barangays told me that water from their deepwells contain mud or salt water.
15 Of which, one barangay (Hilapnitan)'s water system was broken at the time of my field visit.
TABLE 3.2.
Rural Barangays with Functioning Water Systems by Type of Systems
Barangays with Functioning Water Systems among Those Visited 31
Protected springs with gravity-fed distribution networks 28
Protected springs to which communal faucets are attached (no distribution network) 1
Wells 2
TABLE 3.3.
Rural Barangays with Abandoned and Occasionally Used Wells
Total Barangays Barangays
number of with with
barangays abandoned occasionally
visited wells a used wells
Barangays with spring water systems 29 9 5
Barangays with functioning wells 2 0 0
Barangays with no system or systems with little coverage 4 2 0
Barangays with broken systems 1 0 1
Total 36 11 6
a includes wells used only for non-drinking purpose.
How about the level of service of these gravity-fed systems in Baybay? In each
rural barangay I visited, I asked how many households use public taps and individual
connections respectively. Table 3.4 summarizes the result for the 28 barangays with
distribution networks. As shown in this table, more than two thirds of these barangays
predominantly rely on public faucets for their water delivery. Only four out of 28
barangays mainly use individual household connections. Most of the rural residents in
Baybay use public taps.
TABLE 3.4.
Rural Barangays with Gravity-fed Water Systems by Level of Service
Barangays with Gravity-fed Distribution Networks 28
Public faucets only 8
Public faucets for most households and individual connections for a few households 12
Public faucets for about a half of households and individual connections for the remaining half 4
Individual connections for most households 4
As evidenced in the fact that many rural barangays replaced their deepwells with
gravity-fed systems from springs, they are willing to fetch spring water because of its
cleanliness.16 Besides deepwells, there are some other traditional water sources for the
rural barangays, such as rivers and unprotected wells. The rural residents in Baybay,
however, primarily rely on spring water facilities because they perceive spring water is
better than water from other traditional sources.
The rural water systems in Baybay had been operated at least for a year as the
municipality conducted the aforementioned household survey one year before my field
visits. My interviews at the rural barangays, moreover, revealed that these systems had
been in operation for many more years (Table 3.5). In a few barangays, these water
systems sometimes deliver less water especially during dry seasons. It is because,
however, of the capacity of springs rather than of faulty maintenance of the systems." In
general, the rural barangays in Bayabay show good performance in maintaining their
water systems.
TABLE 3.5.
Length of Operation of Water Facilities in the Rural Barangays Visited a
a These lengths are the numbers of years passed since the last significant improvements in water systems.
The significant improvements here refer to the new construction of the entire system and the expansion of
capacity of the existing system to serve more populations.
16 See 4.1. for more discussion about clean spring water in Baybay.
17 Springs in the rural barangays in Baybay are generally small.
Number of Barangays with Functioning Water Systems among Those Visited 31
Up to 3 years 17
Up to 5 years 5
Up to 10 years 7
More than 10 years 2
3.2. Financing of Rural Water Systems without User Fees
User fees can be levied in various ways. First, there are variations in the extent of
costs to be recovered through user fees. In some cases, only operation and maintenance
(O&M) costs are recovered, whereas in other cases, both capital and O&M costs are
recovered. In the rural water facilities in Baybay, there is no attempt to recover capital
costs through user fees." The few barangays levying user fees aim to cover O&M costs
only. Second, variations occur with regard to whether volumetric or fixed fees are
charged. In Baybay, the rural barangays that charge fees levy monthly fixed fees with
only one small exception.19
Table 3.6 summarizes my findings about user fees in the rural barangays with
functioning water systems. As shown in this table, about two thirds of these rural
barangays do not charge user fees at all. In the remaining 12 barangays, a third of them
levy user fees only on households with individual connections. Since less than half of
the households have individual connections in these barangays, collected fees are not
enough to cover even minor repairs.20 For the remaining eight barangays levying fees on
entire households, only less than half record high collection efficiency, and only two
18 Many rural residents in Baybay, however, provide labor without receiving wages or with less-than-
market wages. These residents partially cover capital costs in kind .
19 The only exception I found in my sample barangays is a small fraction of the barangay Caridad.
Twenty households in Caridad which have individual connections are levied metered fees, but these
households constitute only 3% of the entire population of Caridad. The remaining households using public
faucets in Caridad do not pay any fee at all.
2 Throughout this thesis, "minor repairs" or "minor maintenance" refers to easy and low-cost maintenance
such as replacement of faucets, sealing of leakage in distribution pipes/tubes, and partial replacement of
these pipes/tubes. In contrast, "major repairs" means complicated and costly maintenance such as larger
replacement of distribution pipes/tubes, and rehabilitation of water intake tanks and reservoirs.
barangays answered that they could cover costs for minor repairs from user fees. For
major repairs, none of the barangays visited could generate sufficient resources only
from user fees.
TABLE 3.6.
User Fees in the Rural Barangays with Functioning Water Systems
User fees only on
No user fees households with User fees on all users
individual connections
Number of barangays
19 4 8
Barangays with high collection
efficiency of user fees - 3 a 3
Barangays earning enough
revenue for minor maintenance - 0 2
from user fees
a In these three barangays, share of households in total number of households are respectively 3%, 15%,
and 50%.
As is clear from these findings, the maintenance budgets of the rural barangays in
Baybay rely primarily on financial sources other than user fees. In fact, these barangays
utilize funds from intergovernmental transfers from the national government.2 ' Table 3.7
shows three examples of how much transfer funding the rural barangays in Baybay
received in 1995. My interviews indicated that the rural barangays in Baybay use three
to ten percent of their total transfers for maintenance of water systems, and this amount
is enough for minor maintenance. In addition, salaries for those who maintain water
systems22 also come from these transfers.
2 See 4.2 for more details about the intergovernmental transfers in the Philippines.
22 They are the popularly elected barangay councilors. 3.4 illustrates this point further.
TABLE 3.7.
Intergovernmental Transfers from National Government to Rural Barangays in Baybay in 1995
Barangays Butigan Banahao San Juan
Number of Households 74 173 219
Amount of Intergovernmental Transfers (US$) a 6,309 7,441 8,034
Intergovernmental Transfers per Household (US$) " 85 43 37
Source: Brangay Bookkeepers Office of the Municipality of Baybay.
a Exchange rate: US $1 = 25.71 pesos (1995).
b Per household transfers decrease when the number of households increases. Because of the fixed
allocation formula, total transfers increase less than proportionally to the number of households. See note
48 in Chapter 4.
According to the standard public finance theory, users need not be charged
volumetric fees if the marginal supply cost is considered negligible. In the case of
natural gravity-fed systems from springs, additional service unit consumption costs nil
unless water scarcity intensifies. Given that most water systems in Baybay are natural
gravity-fed systems, absence of volumetric user fees is justified for the marginal cost
pricing principle. A natural gravity-fed system still entails recurring O&M costs,
however. These O&M costs can be financed through either fixed user fees or taxes. It
should be noted, nonetheless, that charging user fees is a norm in practice for many rural
water projects regardless of type of water systems. In the Philippines, for example, the
national government and donor agencies set the principle that operation and maintenance
costs for rural water systems should be recovered through user charge.23 This principle is
adopted for all types of rural water facilities.
There are several reasons to prefer user fees to tax financing. One such reason is
an attempt to match benefits and costs (benefit principle).2 4 Since those who benefit
23 For example, see Asian Development Bank (1996).
24 Another reason is financial autonomy and sustainability. If O&M costs of community water systems
from the system are easily identifiable, the benefit principle of pricing can be applied to
natural gravity-fed systems. According to this principle, user charge is considered more
efficient than tax financing whenever it can be applied. Why is it more efficient? First,
all taxes impose efficiency costs. If subsidies are provided from taxes for services whose
costs can be charged to users, higher levels of taxes might be raised than if tax revenues
are used only for services that cannot be otherwise financed. Second, more importantly
for the discussion here, user charge induces informed decision making of the rural
communities. If the rural residents are not required to shoulder any cost of the systems,
they do not seriously consider whether the planned systems reflect their demands or not.
User charge is regarded as a means to encourage the communities to participate in the
decision making and to reflect their demands." Third, also importantly here, user charge
stimulates efficient performance of water operators. By charging user fees, the revenue
of water operators becomes dependent on users' payments. Users now have the option
of not paying if they feel that the performance of water operators is not worth the price.
This consumers' option of nonpayment threatens the water operators and induces better
maintenance performance.
The rural barangays in Baybay, however, mostly rely on transfers from the national
depend on subsidies from the government, communities may sometimes suffer from non-disbursement of
subsidies from the government. Communities can avoid such a situation by relying on revenues from user
fees instead of subsidies. One more reason is equity consideration. Some empirical studies show that
when rural water systems are subsidized, those who benefit from subsidy are usually not lower-income
households but upper- or middle-income households. Concise but thorough discussion of the reasons for
user charge/cost recovery in rural water systems is found in Briscoe and deFerranti (1988, Box 9).
25 Some authors propose that both capital costs and O&M costs should be fully recovered from within the
rural communities for them to make an informed decision making about water systems. They advocate that
cost recovery of only O&M costs induces inefficient choice of the type of water facilities (Briscoe and
deFerranti 1988, pp.17-18; Churchil, et al. 1987, p.40).
government (tax financing) for their maintenance, instead of user fees from within the
communities. In such situations, user fees cannot encourage an informed decision
making and cannot work as a monitoring mechanism of water operators. What is an
alternative mechanism in the rural barangays in Baybay to reflect the residents' demands
and to regulate the water operators' performance? The following two sections answer
this question.
3.3. Initiative of Rural Communities in Planning and Development of Water
Systems
This section details how the rural water systems are developed in Baybay. The key
actors involved are the rural barangay councils, the municipal politicians, and the two
offices of the municipal government. Each barangay has a council formed by a captain
and seven councilors who are popularly elected. These rural barangay councilors take
the initiative in planning and development of water systems and lobby the municipal
politicians for the systems. Two offices of the municipal government technically help
the barangay councils' initiative. These two offices are the Municipal Development and
Planning Coordinator's Office (MPDC Office) and the Municipal Engineering Office, 26
both of which are headed by licensed engineers.2 7
To illustrate how these actors interact with each other, my findings are detailed
26 The MPDC Office plans and coordinates any activity of the municipal government. The Engineering
Office designs infrastructure and buildings in the municipal projects and supervises construction of them.
Both Offices work together for capital investment projects.
They supervise approximately five paraprofessionals in the MPDC Office and ten in the Engineering
Office. In addition to these paraprofessionals, both offices have a few secretaries.
below in three stages of the development process of rural water systems. The first is the
planning of water facilities in respective barangays. The planning here refers to
deciding whether to construct new water facilities and whether to improve existing water
systems. The second concerns investment decisions by the municipal government. The
municipality has to decide which barangays receive the projects to develop or improve
their water facilities. The third regards design and construction of water facilities.
3.3.1. Planning of Water Facilities
Table 3.8 shows the number of barangays that were planning new development or
improvement of water systems at the time of my field visits. Some planned to develop
new springs to increase the amount of water distributed. Others planned to improve the
capacity of distribution networks. In these barangays, I asked the questions as to who
formulated the plan and how.
TABLE 3.8.
Barangays Planning Major Improvements
Barangays Barangays Barangays
with with systems with broken
functioning with little systems (1)
(Number of Barangays Visited) systems (31) coverage (4)
Barangays planning to develop new springs 8 2 1
Barangays planning to improve distribution networks 7 1 0
TOTAL 15 3 1
In all the barangays planning new springs, the residents or councilors identified the
prospective springs to be developed. These springs were located inside the mountains,
and the people usually found them during their agricultural work. In each barangay, the
barangay council first discusses the plan to develop new springs, and then the barangay
assembly authorizes the plan.2" Once authorized in the assembly, the barangay
councilors propose the plan to the municipality. The Municipal Engineering Office
dispatches its staff to confirm the feasibility of the springs, if the municipality seriously
considers the proposed plan.
In the barangay Zacarito, for example, the barangay council proposed two
prospective springs to be developed. I accompanied the staff of the Engineering Office
to confirm whether the amount of water produced by the springs was enough for water
systems. One barangay councilor brought us to the springs far inside the mountains and
told me that one of the residents found these springs while he harvested coconuts.
In the barangays planning improvements in distribution networks, the process is
the same. The barangay councils discuss where new pipes should be laid, where new
public faucets should be installed, and where new reservoirs should be constructed. The
barangay assemblies, then, discuss and authorize the plan. In the barangay Gacat, for
example, the barangay captain showed me the rough design, developed by the council in
April 1997, of new distribution networks running across the barangay. He explained to
me that the assembly, which was held a few weeks before my visit, authorized the plan
and that he would propose the plan to the municipality soon.
In all the barangays visited, I asked the same questions on the past development
or improvement of water systems. Although some interviewees were not familiar with
28 Local Government Code of 1991 mandates all the barangays to hold the assemblies at least twice a year
(See Sec. 397 and 398 of the Code). The Code specifies that each barangay assembly consists of residents
thereof who are over 15 years of age. According to my interview in the rural barangays in Baybay, their
the past projects, answers were generally the same about the last significant
improvements mostly made during the past decade 29 as in the case of the new projects.
In brief, the elected councils of the rural barangays in Baybay plan water projects and
propose the projects to the municipality.
3.3.2. Investment Decisions of the Municipal Government
How does the municipality decide which barangays' projects should be
implemented after they receive the proposals? The official procedure is that the MPDC
Office recommends which barangays' projects should be included in the investment
plan to the municipal council and the council makes the final decision. The head of the
MPDC Office explained to me that its recommendations are based on the technical,
financial, and social considerations. For example, natural gravity-fed systems are given
more priority than the systems which require electric pumps and elevated tanks because
maintenance of the latter systems is more complicated and costly. Barangays which do
not have water systems are given more priority than those which already have some
systems.
There were some observations contradictory to his explanation, however. The
barangay San Agustin, for example, had no water system although, according to the
barangay councilors, there were a lot of prospective springs in the barangay which
assemblies are usually attended by heads of households.
29 See note a of Table 3.5 for the definition of "significant improvements."
could be developed as natural gravity-fed systems.30 The barangay councilors told me
that they asked for the help of the municipality many times but the municipal
government never responded to them. On the other hand, the municipality already
approved the development of distribution networks which needed an electric pump in the
barangay Bubon. Furthermore, many other barangays which already had water systems
received funding for the improvement of their systems.
A local businesswoman told me that San Agustin did not receive the assistance
from the municipality because the leaders of the barangay had been politically opposed
to the current mayor's family. This family has held the mayoralty for almost three
decades, except for a brief period of the transition between the Marcos's authoritarian
regime to the current regime. The businesswoman said that such political relations
mattered in the investment decisions of the municipality. Some other interviewees
confirmed her claim. Some municipal employees, for example, told me that good
barangay councilors actively visited the municipal politicians and the high-rank officials
of the municipal government to lobby for their projects and maintained close
relationships with these prominent figures to get their projects approved. The barangay
councilors in Villa Solidaridad also confirmed the importance of close contact with the
local elite of the municipal government and blamed the former barangay councilors of
Villa Solidaridad for not being active lobbyists. In fact, I frequently saw many barangay
councilors at the town hall visiting the municipal politicians and the high-rank officials
30 This story of the barangay councilors was plausible because the neighboring barangays on both sides of
San Agustin had gravity-fed water systems from springs. The natural circumstances were unlikely to be
different in these barangays.
to promote their projects.31
3.3.3. Design and Construction of Water Facilities
In all the 31 barangays with functioning water systems in my sample, I asked who
designed the facilities in the latest significant improvements32 and who and how
constructed them.
The MPDC Office and the Engineering Office usually design the systems, since
the design of water facilities requires technical knowledge. In particular, water intake
tanks and reservoirs are designed solely by these offices. The distribution networks,
however, are designed with more inputs from the barangays. As described in 3.3.1, the
rural barangays prepare their rough designs of distribution networks including locations
of public faucets. The design is finalized with technical advice of the two offices of the
municipality.
Table 3.9 shows who constructed the facilities in the last significant improvements
in the 31 barangays. As is clear from this table, the most barangays relied on their
residents to construct the facilities. In some cases, the residents worked without wages.
The barangay councilors in Maybog, for example, asked their residents through notices
on a bulletin board and household visits to work with them. They incrementally built
their reservoir every weekend. The councilors prepared meals for the volunteers but did
31 1 asked them why they came to the town hall when I saw them there.
32 See note a of Table 3.5 for the definition of "significant improvements."
not pay wages.
TABLE 3.9.
Those Who Construct the Water Facilities in the Rural Barangays Visited
Barangays with Functioning Water Systems among Those Visited 31
Residents work as laborers (without the wages) 29 (15)
Private contractors or skilled labors 7 a
N. A. (Informant did not know) 1
a Of this, only one barangay solely relied on the private contractor. For others, private contractors or
skilled labors share the tasks with residents. For example, in the barangay Sabang, the private contractor
built a spring and reservoir, and residents installed distribution tubes without wages.
The barangay councilors also take the initiative in supervising the construction.
The barangay Bitanhuan, for example, was constructing a new reservoir to increase the
amount of water distributed when I visited the barangay. The barangay councilor in
charge of water systems was supervising the construction activities of their residents. He
was assisted by the Municipal Engineering Office. He relied on the blueprint made by
the Engineering Office and asked advice of the Office periodically. He told me that the
head of the Engineering Office visited the barangay and gave the councilor detailed
advice in the morning before I visited there.
3.3.4. Technical Help from Municipal Engineers
As is clear from the above discussion, the MPDC and the Engineering Offices
always help the initiative of the rural barangays. Technical knowledge of both offices is
crucial in the development process of the rural water systems. A few barangays that
failed to rely on technical help from the both offices exemplify the importance of their
This meal was financed from the transfer funding from the national government.
assistance.
The barangay Banahao designed and constructed a water intake tank without
asking for technical help from the both offices. The barangay councilors in Banahao
misplaced the water intake tank so that it could not store spring water efficiently. As a
result, this water intake tank could not supply enough water to distribution pipes. Staff
from the Engineering Office inspected the cause of malfunctioning of the intake tank,
and based on its recommendation, the intake tank was expanded to cover the right place
of the spring. In another example, the barangay Mapgap did not ask the municipality's
assistance either when it upgraded distribution pipes at a lower elevation of the
distribution network. The barangay councilors installed a pipe with a larger diameter
than that in a higher elevation of the network. These councilors did not know that this
made water pressure go down. If they had asked for the Engineering Office's advice,
they could have avoided this mistake.
Given this importance of technical help from the municipality, it is inevitable for
the rural barangay councilors to keep close relationships with the MPDC and the
Engineering Offices.
3.3.5. Reflecting Communities' Demands
The rural barangay councilors take the initiative in the planning and development
of their water facilities in Baybay. They decide whether to develop and improve water
systems by themselves and lobby for these systems at the municipality level. They are
also very active in designing and constructing water systems. Some rural barangays
even went beyond the recommendations of the MPDC and the Engineering Offices.
They installed household connections or constructed elevated tanks with electric pumps
whereas the MPDC and the Engineering Offices discouraged both practices.34 If the
barangays successfully lobby municipal politicians for their projects, contradicting
recommendations of the technical staff of the municipality do not prove a hindrance.
The fact that the rural barangays take the initiative has an important implication
for sustainability of the systems; that is the rural water systems reflect the residents'
demands. One primary reason of unsustainability of past rural water projects is that
water facilities frequently do not meet the demands of the residents. The popular lesson
from past experience is to duly involve rural communities in the decision-making and
development process of rural water systems. The case of Baybay exactly matches this
lesson. Because of the initiative of the rural community councils, the rural water
systems in Baybay successfully reflect the demands of the rural residents.
It is hard to say, however, whether the rural water systems in Baybay precisely
meet the preferences of the rural residents only from the evidence presented here. It is
especially difficult to see whether the level of service of the water facilities meet the
preferences of the residents; that is a choice between public faucets and individual
household connections. The fact that a few barangays went beyond the
recommendations of the municipal technical staff and installed individual household
34 Heads of both offices told me that they usually recommend public faucets to rural barangays because
they believe that individual connections induce excessive use of water, which generates the water scarcity
problem, given that most of rural barangays do not meter the water use nor charge user fees. They also
recommend not to build elevated tanks with electric pumps because of prior experience in which such
facilities did not work efficiently due to difficulty and high-cost in maintenance.
connections indicates that these barangays prefer individual connections. But it is not
clear whether other barangays prefer public taps to individual connections or they use
public taps despite their preferences for individual connections for some reasons.3 5 It is
nonetheless clear that the rural water facilities in Baybay still reflect the residents'
demands. They prefer their spring water systems to deepwells and other traditional
water sources. Public faucets may not be the best solution for the residents, but spring
water systems are at least more improved solution for them than deepwells or traditional
sources.
The initiative of the rural barangay councils also explains the paradox concerning
the user fees raised in the previous section. Charging user fees is expected to induce
rural communities to make informed decisions about whether to develop water systems.
In the case of Baybay, even without user fees, the rural barangays are able to make such
decisions through the popularly elected councils.
3.4. Elected Barangay Councilors as Responsive Water Operators
This section details how the rural water systems are maintained in Baybay. As is
similar to the development stage, the key actors involved are the rural barangay councils
and the two offices of the municipal government, the MPDC and Engineering Offices.
3.4.1 Election As a Monitoring Mechanism
As described previously in 3.2, the user charge does not function as a monitoring
35 One possible reason is that their springs are so small that individual household connections are
mechanism of maintenance performance in the rural barangays in Baybay. These
barangays, however, maintain their water facilities well. This section explores an
alternative monitoring mechanism functioning in Baybay.
In all the 31 barangays with functioning water systems in my sample, I asked who
maintains the systems. Table 3.10 summarizes the result. As shown in this table,
popularly elected barangay councilors assume maintenance responsibilities in these
barangays. In each rural barangay in Baybay, respective barangay councilors are
assigned to particular tasks, such as peace and order, health, and social welfare. In the
majority of these barangays, one councilor is assigned to maintain water systems. If
necessary, other barangay councilors and residents help him. The councilors in two
barangays collectively maintain the systems. In three barangays, the councils hire
residents from within the communities to maintain the systems, and the barangay
councilors supervise these maintenance crews. Even in the two barangays that primarily
use wells and where users themselves maintain their wells, the councilors told me that
when the gravity-fed systems are completed, they would be in charge of maintaining the
systems. In fact, in all the barangays with functioning water systems examined,
popularly elected barangay councilors primarily assume (or plan to assume)
maintenance responsibilities of rural water systems. In each barangay, a councilor
assigned to its water system is in charge of not only maintenance but also planning of the
system. Therefore, this councilor played a major role in the planning and development
process described in 3.3 as well. Sometimes, this councilor is in charge of infrastructure
technically unfeasible.
as a whole, including water systems, barangay halls, basketball courts, and so fourth.
TABLE 3.10.
Water Operators in the Rural Barangays with Functioning Water Systems
Barangays with Functioning Water Systems among Those Visited 31
One assigned barangay councilor maintains the system. 23
Barangay councilors collectively maintain the system. 2
Maintenance crews supervised by barangay councilors maintain the system. 4
Users of the particular well collectively maintain the well they use. 2 a
a The barangays which primarily use wells.
The barangay councilors in charge frequently inspect their water systems and
conduct minor repairs, such as replacement of communal faucets and sealing of leakage
in water distribution pipes/tubes with rubber strips. These councilors are quite
accountable. While I inspected water systems in respective barangays with them, these
councilors pointed out numerous portions of water systems that they repaired. Many
people fetching water from communal faucets at the time I visited told me that these
councilors worked conscientiously. In the barangay Butigan, the barangay councilor
who took me around found a leakage in a distribution tube and immediately repaired the
leakage with rubber strips after my interview.
What mechanism disciplines their maintenance performance? I asked the
barangay councilors why they work conscientiously to maintain the systems. Their
answers generally attributed their performance to the fact that they were popularly
elected to serve their constituents. A councilor of the barangay Maybog, for example,
told me that councilors are willing to serve constituents who elect them because serving
constituents is the responsibility of those elected. I also ask the same questions to some
residents fetching water at the time of my visit, and their answers are generally the same
as the councilors. Their answers suggest that popular election functions as a monitoring
mechanism of maintenance performance of the councilors.
3.4.2. Technical Help from Municipal Engineers
The rural baranagys cannot fulfill maintenance tasks solely, however. Technical
help from the MPDC and the Engineering Offices is also important for maintenance of
water facilities. As discussed before, barangay councilors can conduct minor
maintenance only. Typical minor maintenance are replacement of public faucets, repair
of leakage of distribution pipes/tubes, partial replacement of these pipes/tubes, and
cleaning of inside of water intake tanks and reservoirs. Barangay councilors need to rely
on the MPDC and the Engineering Offices for more complicated problems, such as
rehabilitation of water intake tanks and reservoirs. In barangay Higulo-an, for example,
a barangay councilor in charge of water systems found leakage in one of their reservoirs
a few days before my visit. The captain of the barangay told me that they would ask the
Municipal Engineering Office to inspect the reservoir because its repair was beyond the
barangay councilors' knowledge. Since major repairs often cost much more than minor
ones, the municipality usually fund these repairs through the same process as described
in 3.3. For example, the barangay Hilapnitan, whose water facilities are destroyed by
the typhoon, asked the Municipal Engineering Office to inspect their broken facilities.
They were proposing the municipality to rehabilitate their facilities based on the
diagnosis of the Engineering Office.
Close contacts with these municipal offices are important for timely help in major
repairs. These offices are preoccupied with various responsibilities. It is not easy for
them to respond to all the requests timely. The closer relations a barangay maintains,
the more likely it enjoys a timely help from these offices. I accompanied a staff of the
MPDC Office in my visit to the rural baranagys. He pointed out how kindly the rural
barangay councilors welcome and entertain us. He told me that these councilors knew
the importance of keeping friendly relations with the MPDC and the Engineering
Offices.
3.5. Political Institutions: Rural Community Councils and Their Interactions with
Municipal Elite
This chapter describes how the rural water systems in Baybay are developed and
maintained. It particularly illustrates an alternative mechanism in Baybay to reflect rural
communities' demands and to regulate water operators' performance in the absence of
user fees. The primary actors involved in this mechanism are the popularly elected
barangay councils, the municipal politicians, and the two technical offices of the
municipal government.
The barangay councils take the initiative to plan and develop water systems and
lobby the municipal politicians for the systems. Their water systems thereby reflect the
barangay residents' demands. Election of barangay councilors functions as a
monitoring mechanism of the councilors' performance in maintaining the water systems.
Technical help from knowledgeable engineers in the municipal government help the
rural barangays develop and maintain the systems.
The key institutions in these mechanisms are the popularly elected rural barangay
councils and their interactions with the municipal elite, i.e. the municipal politicians and
engineers. Because of their political nature, I would like to call them "political
institutions." The functioning of these political institutions led to the good performance
of rural water systems in Baybay.
This finding leads to the second question of this thesis: what conditions enable
these political institutions to work in Baybay? Answering this question is the task of the
next chapter.
CHAPTER 4
EXPLAINING GOOD PERFORMANCE:
WHAT ENABLES POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS TO WORK?
This chapter explains what conditions enable the political institutions to work in
the rural water systems in Baybay. It particularly addresses the four questions raised in
the first chapter: Why is the municipal elite not an obstacle to the rural communities'
initiative? What enables the rural barangays to take the initiative in developing water
systems? Why are the rural barangay councilors accountable? Why do capable
engineers wish to work for the municipal government?
Before these questions are addressed, the first two sections provide the necessary
background for the explanation. The first section describes the history of the
development of water systems in Baybay. The second section introduces the current
decentralization policy and its effects on the Baybay municipal government. The
following four sections deal with the above four questions respectively.
4.1. History of Water Systems Development in Baybay
The history of the development of water systems in Baybay must start with the
description of its natural endowment of spring water because this particular condition
shapes the historical development of water systems in this municipality.
Almost all the rural water systems in Baybay are gravity-fed systems from
protected springs (Table 3.2). This is unique, compared with other rural areas in the
Philippines. Unlike those in Baybay, most of the rural residents in the Philippines rely
on groundwater for their water sources (Table 4.1). Even compared with its neighboring
towns, Baybay is relatively well endowed with spring water. Though data has been
gathered about urban water systems only, Table 4.2 demonstrates that Baybay is better
endowed with spring water than other towns in the same province.36
TABLE 4.1.
Access to Potable Water in Rural Areas of the Philippines by Type of Water Systems in 1995
Total Rural Population Having Access to Potable Water 70%
Wells with Hand Pumps 42%
Wells driven by Diesel Pumps 9%
Gravity-fed Systems 7%
Other Sources such as Rainwater Catchments and Unprotected Wells and Springs 12%
Source: Asian Development Bank (1996).
TABLE 4.2.
Water Sources of Water Districts (WDs) in the Leyte Province
Total Number of WDs in the Province 12
WDs with Springs only 2 a
WDs with Wells (Groundwater) only 7
WDs with Surface Water only 1
WDs with Springs and either Wells or Surface Water 2
Source: National Water Regulatory Board
a including Baybay Water District.
Not only is spring water abundant in Baybay but its quality is also good. The water
quality of the urban water system run by the Baybay Water District (BWD) passed the
quality standard set by the World Health Organization (WHO). During my stay in
Baybay, I consumed water from taps of the urban system and had no health problem.
36 Most of my interviewees in Baybay were also eager to point out that Baybay is blessed with abundant
This is a rare situation in the Philippines. Foreigners are usually advised not to drink
water from taps because of the fear of contamination. Water quality of the rural systems
in Baybay as a whole is also generally acceptable, according to the water and sanitation
inspectors of the municipal government who periodically conduct water quality testing in
the rural barangays.37 The springs for these systems exist far inside the mountains and at
higher elevation than do residences. Therefore, they can be free from contamination by
human wastes and other domestic wastes.38
The environmentalist tradition in Baybay also contributes to non-contamination of
spring water by discouraging large-scale industrial activities, such as mining, which
potentially contaminate spring water. This tradition stems from the second biggest
national agricultural college in the Philippines, Visayas State College of Agriculture
(VISCA), located in Baybay. With assistance from the national government and foreign
donor agencies, VISCA runs many environmental research and conservation projects,
such as community forest and fishery management. The faculty there, including foreign
experts, is concerned about preservation of the natural environment. VISCA is highly
respected by residents of Baybay, and the VISCA faculty's concerns are largely shared
spring water.
37 Even in some rural barangays whose spring water is judged unsafe by the inspectors, the residents still
continue to drink spring water from their systems. For example, the residents in the barangay San Juan
told me that they still fetch water from their water system even though its water quality has been judged
unsafe. According to these residents, water from the system still tastes better than water from other
sources.
38 I visited water sources of the urban system and ten rural systems. Their spring water is very simply
treated because spring water itself is clean at its source. For the urban system, spring water is regularly
chlorinated, and it does not need more complicated treatment. As for the rural systems, among the 31
barangays with functioning systems I visited, only 15 barangays chlorinate their spring water, and most of
those do so only occasionally. I looked inside the water intake tanks and found that their spring water was
generally very clear.
with the residents. For example, during the municipal council session in which I sat,
municipal councilors discussed the proposal for mining activities by the state-owned
corporation and resolved to oppose the proposal in spite of possible economic benefits of
the mining activities.
This natural endowment of abundant and clean spring water led to an early
development of water systems in Baybay. As early as 1925, during the American rule,
the municipal government constructed its first urban piped water system with assistance
from the national and provincial governments. The system served the Poblacion and its
surrounding barangays through a few household connections and public faucets. This
gravity-fed system has been gradually upgraded since then and has become the current
system run by BWD (Vega 1989).
Following the development of this urban water system, some rural water systems
emerged after the second World War and the independence of the Philippines. Table 4.3
shows the history of the development of rural water systems for my sample of 28
barangays which have gravity-fed systems. 40 As shown in this table, the rural gravity-
fed systems appeared in the 1950's and have gradually expanded in number and
coverage since then. As early as the 1960's, half of these sample barangays had some
sort of spring water system, although most of them served much lesser percentage of the
39 There were competing positions about this issue, however. In the municipal council session, one
councilor pointed out economic benefits, such as creation of new employment, of the mining proposal. A
local businesswoman, in my interview, also mentioned the need for investment from outside the town to
boost the backward economy of the town. On the other hand, the captain of the barangay Pangasugan,
where VISCA is located, lobbied for the opposition on the grounds of environmental conservation.
40 In these barangays, I asked when respective parts (i.e. each spring, reservoir, and distribution network)
of the water system were constructed. Table 4.3 summarizes the result.
population than they do today. It was not until the 1990's, however, that the rural water
systems reached the current coverage of beneficiaries. Among 28 sample barangays,
only three systems served in 1980's the same population that they are serving today. The
remaining 25 barangays significantly improved their water systems in the 1990's.
Among these 25 barangays, five had no spring water system in the 1980's. Another five
had only one or a few springs each and did not have distribution networks. The
remaining 15 barangays had gravity-fed distribution networks, but their coverage was
limited.
TABLE 4.3.
Chronology of Development of Gravity-fed Water Systems in 28 Rural Barangays in Baybay
Before 1950's 1960's 1970's 1980's 1990-91 After
1950 1992 a
Barangays having at least
one developed/protected
spring without distribution 2 3 4 5 5 5 0
networks.
Barangays having
developed/protected
springs with partial 0 3 9 14 15 12 0
distribution networks.
Barangays having
developed/protected
springs with full 0 0 1 1 3 6 28
distribution networks. b
Total
(Barangays having some
sorts of spring water 2 6 14 20 23 23 28
systems) I
a After the current decentralization policy was implemented.
b "Full distribution network" here refers to the distribution networks which has the same coverage as that
of today.
Although exact figures of the coverage of these rural water systems in the 1980's
were not available, several interviews confirmed that significant improvement occurred
and the coverage dramatically increased during the 1990's. According to the vice mayor
elected together with the current mayor in 1988, less than ten rural barangays had water
systems which covered a significant part of their population in the end of 1980's. A
separate interview with the head of the MPDC Office confirmed the vice mayor's claim.
He told me that when he conducted a preliminary survey to identify the situation of rural
water facilities in 1991, only about ten barangays had water systems with sufficient
coverage. One question inevitably follows: why were rural water facilities in Baybay
significantly expanded in the 1990's? Table 4.3 shows that the most improvements
occurred after 1992, when the current decentralization policy of the Philippine
government was set in place. To see the relations between the decentralization policy
and the significant expansion of the rural water systems in Baybay, the next section
details the background of the current decentralization policy of the Philippine
government and its effects on the municipal government of Baybay.
4.2. Current Decentralization Policy of the Philippine Government*"
The current decentralization policy originated from the restoration of the
democratic regime in 1986 after the collapse of the authoritarian rule of President
Marcos. Marcos's rule is characterized as the period toward political centralization since
41 There exist many books and articles on the current decentralization policy of the Philippine government.
Only a few examples are listed here. For a comprehensive account of the Local Government Code of
1991, see Tabunda and Galang (1992), which was a detailed primer of the Code. A brief but thorough
account of history of local governments in the Philippines, main features of the current decentralization
policy, and the effects of the first few years of implementation of the policy is Brillantes, Jr. (1997).
USAID conducts annual survey of the effects of the current decentralization policy, and the results are
distributed as Rapid Field Appraisal every year.
he suspended the election of local officials and exercised the power to appoint these
officials under martial law (1972-1981).42 President Aquino, who came into power in
1986, restored regular elections at both national and local levels 43 and declared a policy
to devolve greater power to local governments." After pilot projects and a few years'
deliberation in the congress, the new Local Government Code, the base of the current
decentralization policy, was approved in the congress in 1991 and implemented from
1992.
This decentralization policy is said to be "by far the most radical and far reaching"
(Brillantes, Jr. 1997, p.7) among the past attempts to decentralize public administration
in the Philippines. One prominent feature of this policy is the transfer of several public
service responsibilities and regulatory powers from the national government to local
governments. These public services include primary health and hospital services, social
welfare services, environmental management, agricultural extension, and rural
infrastructure including rural water systems.45 The regulatory powers include approval
42 Although he increased the central control of local governments, Marcos created regional offices of the
national ministries and thereby "deconcentrated" the national government administration (de Guzman,
Reforma, and Panganiban 1988).
43 After Marcos declared the martial law in 1972, local elections were held once under his regime (in 1980
for provincial, city, and municipal elections, and in 1982 for barangay elections). It was not until
President Aquino came into power, however, that regular local elections were restored. Since then, three
local elections have been conducted (in 1988, 1992, and 1995 for provincial, city, and municipal elections,
and in 1989, 1994, and 1997 for barangay elections). Local Government Code of 1991 regularized local
elections every three years. The next provincial, city, and municipal elections are scheduled in May, 1998.
" The 1987 Constitution promulgated by President Aquino declares that "the state shall ensure the
autonomy of local governments" and that "the congress shall enact a local government code which shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization." Local Government Code of 1991 was enacted following this provision of the
Constitution.
45 Other infrastructure include local roads, school buildings, public housing, and tourism facilities. The
responsibility for rural water systems was officially transferred by this decentralization policy, although
of real estate subdivisions, reclassification of agricultural lands, enforcement of building
codes and environmental laws, and so forth. Accordingly, a large number of personnel
46
were transferred from the national government agency to local governments.
Another prominent feature is the significant increase of intergovernmental
transfers, which are officially referred to as the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRA).
Under the new Local Government Code, 40% of the national government's "internal
revenue" 4 7 is transferred to local governments as unconditional grants. This 40% share
of the internal revenue is automatically distributed among different levels of local
governments according to a fixed allocation formula.48 IRA significantly increased
compared to before 1991, when only 20% of the internal revenue was allocated to local
governments. IRA quadrupled in real terms from 1991, before the current
decentralization policy, to 1996 (Table 4.4). As a result, the share of local government
expenditure to total government expenditure increased from 6.0% in 1991 to 22.5% in
1995 (Cuaresma and Ilago 1996, Figure 1.4). Local governments have discretion
Baybay municipal government had implemented its rural water projects much earlier. According to the
Local Government Code of 1991: municipalities and cities construct rural water facilities; provinces
construct inter-municipality or inter-city water facilities (for rural areas); and rural barangays assume
maintenance responsibility (Tabunda and Galang 1992, p.1-22).
46 The numbers of personnel transferred from the national government departments to local governments
are 45,945 for primary health and hospital services, 4,127 for social welfare, 895 for environmental
management, and 17,823 for agricultural extension (Brillantes, Jr. 1997).
47 "Internal revenue," which is defined in the National Internal Revenue Code, includes sales tax, specific
tax, tax on financial institutions, etc. This does not include all the government revenues. For example,
import duties are not included. In any particular year, 40% of the internal revenue of the third preceding
year is transferred to local governments.
48 The 40% share of internal revenue is first divided among four categories of local governments:
provinces altogether receive 23% of the total transfers; cities receive 23% of them; municipalities share
32%; and barangays have 20%. Within each category of provinces, cities, and municipalities: 50% of the
total amount is distributed proportionally to population; 25% is distributed proportionally to land area; and
25% is distributed equally. For barangays, 60% of the total amount is distributed proportionally to
regarding how to spend these transfers except for the requirement that a minimum of
20% of IRA should be spent for "development projects," which primarily means capital
investments. Though the minimum spending is required, the local governments can
determine what projects are to be included.49
TABLE 4.4.
Intergovernmental Transfers from the Philippine National Government to Local Governments at
1990 Constant Price in US$ a b
Year Intergovernmental Transfers
1991 288,188,211
1992 612,362,149
1993 972,857,540
1994 1,165,326,986
1995 1,230,704,731
1996 1,212,132,966
Source: Brillantes, Jr. (1997, p.9).
" As a transitory measure, share of transfers in the internal revenue was gradually increased
from 20% in 1991, to 30% in1992, 35% in 1993, and 40% in 1994.
b Consumer Price Index and the period average market foreign exchange rate for each year,
from IMF, International Financial Statistics, are used for the calculation.
As a result of this decentralization policy, the municipal government of Baybay
assumes greater public service and regulatory responsibilities compared to before. The
municipal government accepted staff and facilities of two primary health care offices, a
social welfare office, and an agricultural extension office from the national government.
In addition, the municipality created a few new offices to exercise its increased
responsibilities. For example, it created the Municipal Engineering Office, whose
function had previously belonged to the MPDC Office.
population, and 40% is distributed equally.
49 Local governments are required to report the development plans to the national Department of Interior
and Local Government (DILG); however, they do not need any approval from DILG unlike before the
current decentralization policy.
As shown in Table 4.5, IRA allocated to Baybay in 1996 almost tripled in real terms
from 1991, before the current decentralization policy. The significant increase of IRA
resulted in a great increase of the municipality's revenue and expenditure. The
dramatically improved financial status enabled the municipal government to increase its
capital investments. The capital outlay of the municipality in 1996 became more than
five times greater in real terms than in 1991. A sizable amount was spent for rural water
systems.50 This increase of financial capacity made the significant expansion of rural
water systems after 1992 possible.
TABLE 4.5.
Annual Revenue and Expenditure of the Municipality of Baybay at 1990 Constant Price in US $ a b
Year 1991 1993 1995 1996
Revenue
IRA 177,536 (63%) 443,635 (82%) 602,386 (85%) 589,309 (77%)
Local Revenue 102,781 (37%) 95,059 (18%) 108,182 (15%) 114,938 (15%)
Grants and Aids 0 3,976 (1%) 0 0
Borrowings 0 0 0 64,636 ( 8%)
Total Revenue (100%) 280,317 542,670 710,568 768,883
Expenditure
Personnel Services 168,074 (61%) 249,273 (54%) 392,756 (54%) 386,233 (55%)
Operation and Maintenance 75,740 (28%) 133,038 (29%) 215,170 (29%) 159,711 (23%)
Capital Outlay 31,446 (11%) 77,728 (17%) 125,238 (17%) 160,615 (23%)
Total Expenditure (100%) 275,260 460,040 733,164 706,560
Source: The Accounting Office of the municipal government.
" Consumer Price Index and the annual average market foreign exchange rate for each year, from IMF,
International Financial Statistics, are used for the calculation.
b Date for 1992 and 1994 were not available.
It should be noted here that Baybay benefits from the increased IRA much more
than most other municipalities. Baybay consistently receives IRA about three times
50 See 4.3 and Table 4.7. for details about budgetary allocation to rural water systems in Baybay after the
decentralization.
greater than the average amount of IRA allocated to all municipalities." This is because
the allocation formula of IRA is set such that greater amounts are allocated to
municipalities which have larger populations and land area than others. Because of its
large population and land area, Baybay enjoys greater receipt of IRA than average.
Consequently, the municipality of Baybay belongs to the third of six income
(government revenue) classes determined by the national Department of Finance and to
the upper 13% of all municipalities (Table4.6). This relative affluence partly explains
why the municipality of Baybay can successfully provide rural water facilities while
most other municipalities fail to do so. Even this, however, does not fully explain the
expansion nor guarantee the functioning of the political institutions described in the
previous chapter. It should be further explored how other aspects of decentralization
policy and other conditions jointly lead to the function of the political institutions. The
remaining of this chapter is devoted to this task by specifically addressing the four
questions listed previously.
TABLE 4.6.
Distribution of Municipalities by Income (Government Revenue) Class a
Income Class (highest to lowest) 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th Total
Number of Municipalities 30 47 119 375 608 239 1,418
(Share) (2%) (3%) (8%) (26%) (43%) (17%) (100%)
Source: Legaspi, Cabo, and Joaquin (1996, Table 2)
a The data cover 92% of all the municipalities.
4.3. Rural Water Systems As Political Means to Mobilize Electoral Support
This section aims to answer the question of why the municipal elite is not an
From 1991 to 1996, IRA for Baybay ranges from 0.152% to 0.193% of total IRA for all 1,542
obstacle to the initiative of the rural communities. I claim that, because of the
cleanliness of their water, the spring water systems became an important instrument for
the municipal elite in Baybay to solicit electoral support from the rural communities.
Therefore, the municipal elite's interests match the rural communities' interests in
support of the rural water systems.
In the Philippines, all the municipal mayors, vice mayors, and councilors are
popularly elected. These municipal politicians bring government projects to both urban
and rural communities or leaders thereof to solicit electoral support. 2 This does not
always mean that the municipal politicians accountably provide public services because
they tend to favor only the personal needs of the powerful supporters. Local politics in
the Philippines, therefore, are often labeled "machine politics," "clientelism," "bossism"
and the like.53 Whatever the consequences are, the municipal politicians have incentives
to provide communities with certain kinds of constituency services to solicit electoral
support.
The current national congressman from the electoral district including Baybay54
long assumed the mayoralty of the town from 1964 to 1980. As was the case with other
local politicians in the country, he was successful in soliciting continual electoral support
municipalities whereas the average IRA for a municipality is 0.065%.
5 At the turn of this century, when popular election was introduced under the American rule, landed
families ruled localities and could mobilize electoral support through their traditional patronage
relationships with tenants. As electoral competition intensified, local politicians became more and more
dependent on the government resources to solicit electoral support. See Machado (1974a, 1974b) and
Nowak and Snyder (1974).
53 For example, "machine politics" is used by Machado (1974b), Nowak and Snyder (1974); "clientelism"
is used by Nowak and Snyder (1974), Scott (1972); "bossisim" is used by McBeth (1989), Sidel (1995).
54 This congressional electoral district consists of Baybay plus eight adjacent municipalities.
by providing government projects to those who could bring votes." He brought various
projects, such as roads, water facilities, and school buildings, to both urban and rural
barangays in exchange for votes. Among these projects, water facilities were most
appreciated among these barangays. I asked more than two dozen residents what was
the most significant achievement of the congressman when he was a mayor. One of the
most frequently cited was drinking water provision both for urban and rural.56 As for the
urban water system, he reorganized its administration and created the Baybay Water
District (BWD). After this reform, the urban water system expanded its facilities and
improved its financial status." He also expanded rural water systems in several
barangays. The rural gravity-fed water systems increased during the 1960's and the
1970's under his administration (Table 4.3). In my interviews, the residents in the
barangays, where rural water systems were first constructed during this period,
emphasized the initiative of the current congressman to provide water systems.
As discussed in the previous section, the expansion of rural water systems in his
administration was limited. But, the rural residents appreciate the systems because of
5 Municipal elections were suspended after 1972 under the Martial Law; however, the current
congressman won mayoral elections three successive times before the suspension of election. One of my
interviewee told me that the congressman was able to win mayoral election many times because he was
very skillful and good at doing politics.
56 Another significant achievement often cited was the building of public market, which located in the
center of Poblacion and functioned as the commercial center of Baybay and its neighboring towns. There
were several others such as roads and bridges; however, urban and rural water projects as well as public
market were the most frequently pointed out.
5 This reform was the response to the national government initiative to reorganize urban water systems
throughout the country (except for Metro Manila). The national government set up the state-owned agency
to assist urban water systems, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) in 1973. The function of
LWUA is to provide soft loan and technical assistance to Water Districts (WDs), locally established
independent water corporation. After its formation, BWD borrowed loans and received technical
assistance from LWUA.
their clean water. The early experience of providing the rural water facilities brought
about important lessons for the municipal politicians in later periods. It proved that
spring water facilities are the relatively easy-to-meet demands of the rural residents, and
that the provision of these facilities is an effective and ready measure to solicit and
maintain electoral support.
As a result of this early experience, after the decentralization increased the
available funding for the municipality, a considerable amount of the budget was
continually channeled into the rural water facilities.58 Table 4.7 shows the annual
budgetary allocation of 20% of IRA, which is mandated to spend for "development
projects." Among infrastructure projects, excluding the first three rows of the table,
water systems received the biggest allocation from 1992 to 1995, except for two projects
for urban areas, the reclamation 59 and the municipal government buildings. Accordingly,
the number and coverage of the rural water systems significantly increased as shown in
Table 4.3.
A local political condition in Baybay should be cited in this context, namely the
long-term stability of the ruling family. In Baybay, the same family has held the
mayoralty for almost three decades.60 If government services are exchanged for political
support, some communities which do not support the current municipal administration
would be left out and could not receive these services. Steffes (1997) reports that she
58 The current mayor first came into power in 1988, and she was reelected twice in 1992 and 1995. She
prioritized rural water projects.
59 Reclamation of the bay in the Poblacion, where a bus terminal and other buildings are planned to be
built.
60 The current mayor is a sister of the current congressman.
encountered a community organizer who claimed such a situation in Brazil. Although
this is also the case in Baybay, as briefly described in the previous chapter, the long-term
stable rule of the same family signaled the rural barangays to understand whom they
should support and lobby to receive water facilities. Consequently, most of the rural
barangays successfully lobby and gain water facilities.
TABLE 4.7.
Annual Budgetary Allocation of 20% of IRA in Baybay at 1990 Constant Price in US $ a
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Agriculture &Business 0 0 0 12,477 7,825 5,363 4,817
Support (0%) (0%) (0%) (11%) (7%) (5%) (4%)
Reforestation 0 0 0 0 0 2,145 2,676
(0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (2%) (2%)
Training, Survey, etc. 0 0 16,054 12,749 21,342 16,305 20,874
(0%) (0%) (17%) (11%) (18%) (14%) (17%)
Roads 19,621 4,131 0 2,994 6,165 10,298 14,808
(67%) (17%) (0%) (3%) (5%) (9%) (12%)
Rural Water Systems 3,679 12,570 16,575 12,427 12,094 7,080 4,460
(13%) (51%) (18%) (11%) (10%) (6%) (4%)
Reclamation 0 0 25,978 49,907 47,426 42,907 35,682
(0%) (0%) (28%) (43%) (39%) (36%) (29%)
Municipal Government 3,986 0 23,327 13,974 11,382 15,232 15,343
Buildings (14%) (0%) (25%) (12%) (9%) (13%) (12%)
Barangay Buildings b 0 6,374 8,642 3,743 8,300 11,800 14,537
(0%) (26%) (9%) (3%) (7%) (10%) (12%)
Sanitation 1,931 1,364 1,180 0 0 0 0
(Public Toilet) (7%) (6%) (1%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%)
Irrigation 0 0 1,856 1,996 2,846 2,145 2,676
(0%) (0%) (2%) (2%) (2%) (2%) (2%)
Flood Control 0 0 460 3,244 1,897 3,046 5,352
(0%) (0%) (0%) (3%) (2%) (3%) (4%)
School Buildings 0 0 0 1,497 949 1,716 2,676
(0%) (0%) (0%) (1%) (1%) (1%) (2%)
TOTALc 29,217 24,439 94,071 115,008 120,225 118,038 123,904
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Source: MPDC Office of the municipal government of Baybay.
a Consumer Price Index and the period average market foreign exchange rate for each
International Financial Statistics, are used for the calculation.
year, from IMF,
b Brangay halls, health centers, police stations, basketball courts, street lightning, etc. for both urban and
rural barangays.
c This expenditure is mostly capital outlay; however this total does not correspond to the figure in Table
4.5 because the figure in Table 4.5 is actual expenditure whereas the figure here is budgetary
appropriation.
4.4. Institutionalizing Community Planning
This section deals with the question of what enables the rural barangays to take the
initiative in planning water facilities. I claim that the planning support from the
municipality, initiated after the decentralization policy, helped institutionalize and
encourage the planning process of the rural barangays.
The decentralization policy in 1992 stimulated the planning activities of the rural
barangays in two primary ways: the increased intergovernmental transfers and the
support for their planning activities from the municipality.
As in the case of the municipal government, barangays also received the increased
intergovernmental transfers (IRA) from the national government as a result of the
decentralization policy. Before the current decentralization, barangays as a whole
received 2% of the internal revenue of the national government while this entitlement
increased to 8% of the internal revenue after the decentralization.61
Municipal employees and some barangay councilors in Baybay told me that, before
the decentralization, only negligible amounts remained for capital investment in the
hands of the barangay councils after they deducted recurring expenditure, such as
honoraria for councilors. It was not until the increase of IRA to barangays that these
barangays have had enough money that they can plan how to spend for projects.
Responding to this new situation, the municipality institutionalized the planning
61 Before the Code, 20% of the internal revenue was allocated to local governments as a whole, and of this
allocation, 10% was entitled to barangays as a group. After the Code, 40% of the internal revenue to local
governments and 20% of this allocation to barangays. Exact figures of IRA allocated to the rural
support for barangays after the decentralization. The MPDC Office began to require all
the barangays to prepare annual investment plans and started to support the barangay
councilors' preparations and implementations of their investment plans. The
municipality also created a new office to help the barangays' budgeting and accounting
in 1994, the Barangay Bookkeepers Office staffed by three personnel.
Barangays can afford to finance only small projects solely on their own because the
IRA to any single barangay is not large.62 These projects include, for example, small
public buildings for barangays, repair of basketball courts, small agricultural facilities,
such as drying beds, and so forth. For other projects which need more funding, the
municipality finances them and as a matter of policy requires counterpart funding from
the budget of the barangays which benefit from the projects. Rural water projects
usually fall into the latter category.
It is in this context that the rural barangay councils take the initiative in developing
their water systems. Increased financial resources became available for capital
investment of the barangays. The barangay councils could exercise discretion over
these increased resources and began to seriously think about how to spend them.
Assistance from the municipality has helped institutionalize the planning process of
these barangay councils. In sum, the decentralization policy stimulated the initiative and
active lobby of the rural barangay councils.
The abundance of clean spring water and the prior experience of water facilities in
barangays in Baybay before the decentralization were not available.
62 See Table 3.7 for three examples of the actual amount of IRA received by the rural barangays in
some rural barangays made water systems a logical choice for their priority in the
planning. Most rural barangays in Baybay have springs feasible for water systems in
their own geographical jurisdictions. Given that there were some antecedents for spring
water systems, it is not difficult for the councilors in these barangays to imagine the
development of the similar systems from their own springs.
It is not clear, however, how the rural water facilities were planned and developed
before, for example, in the 1960's and the 1970's. The detailed stories of the
development process of my interviewees were mostly limited to the past decade. It is
clear, nonetheless, that the decentralization policy institutionalized and substantiated the
planning process of the rural barangays and that most of the significant improvements of
water facilities occurred after the decentralization. Some rural barangay councils,
perhaps in a primitive way, might have proposed and lobbied their spring water projects
even before the decentralization. It was not until the current decentralization, however,
that the process became systematized and more widespread.
4.5. Organizational Traits for Accountability of Rural Barangay Councilors
This section addresses the question of what disciplines the performance of
barangay councilors. The previous chapter reveals that the barangay councilors take the
initiative in planning and development of water facilities and that they conscientiously
maintain these facilities. Election is a natural answer to the above question, given that
these barangay councilors are all popularly elected. It is necessary, however, to further
Baybay.
ask what conditions make popular election an effective performance-inducing
mechanism because we know that there are many elected local politicians who do not
bring accountable public services to their constituents.
I claim that there are three inherent organizational traits in the arrangement of
elected barangay councils in Baybay, which contribute to the function of popular
election as an effective monitoring mechanism. These traits are the community-wide
election, the small size of the community, and the clear division of labor among
councilors.
The first trait is the community-wide election. Community councilors can be
elected either by district or at large. If councilors are elected by district, they concern
primarily their own constituents in the districts they come from. Under such an election
system, councilors are not necessarily accountable to community as a whole since they
are merely representatives of certain portions of the community. A councilor in charge
of water systems or powerful councilors may build water systems only for certain
districts from which they are elected. A councilor assigned to maintenance of water
facilities may also care about water systems in his or her electoral district only and may
pay less attention to the systems in other districts. Alternatively, however, community
councilors can be elected at large. In this case, the above problem can be solved because
any councilor needs to solicit community-wide electoral support for his or her reelection.
In the Philippines, barangay councilors are elected at large,63 and therefore, there are
63 Barangay councilors are elected at large whereas provincial, city, and municipal councilors are elected
by district. All local chief executives, i.e. provincial governors, vice governors, city and municipal
mayors, vice mayors, and barangay captains, are elected at large. See section 41 of the 1991 Local
incentives for barangay councilors to respond to the demands of all the constituents in
their barangay.
The second trait is the small size of the community. Even if community councilors
are elected at large, they may still respond only to the demands of powerful constituents
within a community when the community is large and huge inequalities exist among
community members. In Baybay, however, each rural barangay is quite small and
largely homogenous within any particular barangay. The median number of households
per rural barangay in Baybay is only 138. As shown in Table 2.4 in the second chapter,
most barangays, approximately 70% of total rural barangays and 60% of my sample,
consist of less than 200 households. Each small rural barangay is also largely
homogenous within itself. A landlord living in the Poblacion told me that inequality
exists between the urban communities in the Poblacion and rural barangays rather than
within any particular rural barangay because most of the landlords live in the Poblacion.
Separate interviews with municipal employees64 and field officers of the national
government working in the municipality, 65 who frequently visit rural barangays and are
familiar with the situation thereof, confirmed this view. Some rural residents to whom I
talked also generally agreed. In addition to relative homogeneity, most residents in the
rural barangays in Baybay clustered because of the threat of communist guerrilla attacks
during the past insurgency period. In these situations, constructing water facilities that
can serve the community as a whole is not an impossible task.
Government Code.
64 Agricultural extension officers and nurses for primary health care.
The small size of the community also contributes to the efficiency of residents'
monitoring of councilors' performance in maintaining water systems. Within such a
small community, everyone knows everyone else. Those who maintain the water
systems are close neighbors to any barangay resident. Anybody can immediately
complain about deficiency of water systems to those who maintain the systems. While I
inspected water systems with councilors, residents elsewhere sometimes talked to the
councilors and complained about deficiency in water systems.
The third trait is the clear division of labor among councilors. As described in the
previous chapter, each barangay councilor is assigned to a particular task, and in most
cases, one councilor is assigned to the development and maintenance of water facilities
(or infrastructure as a whole). This arrangement helps rural residents identify to whom
they should complain about deficiency of water facilities. This, more importantly,
increases the efficacy of election as a performance-inducing mechanism by linking the
performance in particular service to an individual politician. If there is no division of
labor among barangay councilors, residents cannot identify whom to blame for
inadequate maintenance of water systems. In the case of the rural barangays in Baybay,
however, the responsibility for water systems is tied to a single barangay councilor, so
that residents can disqualify this particular councilor in the next election if they are
dissatisfied with his or her performance.
The above analysis reveals that election of rural barangay councils in Baybay is,
perhaps unintentionally, well structured to induce good performance of councilors in
65 Department of Agrarian Reform and Philippine Coconuts Agency.
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developing and maintaining water systems. These organizational traits potentially give
elected community councilors the right incentives to be accountable to their constituents.
For this arrangement to be workable, however, I would like to point out two additional
conditions.
The first of these conditions is located in the supply side. Election can work as a
performance-inducing mechanism only when councilors want to be reelected.
Otherwise, they do not feel any threat of invoking dissatisfaction among their
constituents by not meeting their demands. In fact, the rural barangay councilors in
Baybay have incentives to become councilors because they receive adequate financial
compensation. In 1995, for example, each barangay councilor in Baybay received an
annual honorarium of US$408, equivalent to 74% of per capita income of the region.66
These honoraria are financed by intergovernmental transfers (IRA) to each barangay
from the national government. Usually, nearly half of the total amount each barangay
receives is used to pay the honoraria for councilors. Cultural norms in small rural
communities also contribute to the prestige of becoming councilors. In these
communities, taking care of other community residents is appreciated, and those who
can do it are highly respected. Indeed, many barangay councilors told me that they were
willing to serve their community members for this reason.
The second condition is about the demand side. The above monitoring mechanism
does not work unless rural residents prefer to use water facilities and demand proper
66 The average honorarium for a barangay councilor in Baybay was 10,500 pesos in 1995. The average
per capita regional GDP in Region VIII, to which the municipality of Baybay belongs, was 14,206 pesos in
1995. Exchange rate used here is: US$1= 25.71 pesos for 1995.
maintenance of the facilities. Cleanliness of spring water matters here. As previously
discussed, the rural residents in Baybay primarily rely on the councilor-run water
systems because they prefer water from the systems to other traditional water sources.
For this reason, the rural residents keep an eye on the quality of maintenance of water
systems. Without their close attention, even such a potentially effective organizational
arrangement of the rural barangay councils cannot generate the right incentives for the
councilors.
4.6. Local Prestige and Influence as Incentives for Municipal Engineers
Technical help from the municipality is important for the rural barangays in Baybay
to develop and maintain their water systems. Heads of both the MPDC Office and the
Municipal Engineering Office are key persons for this function. They are the only
licensed engineers in the municipal government, and their supervision enables their staff
to provide the rural barangays with technical assistance.
Many local governments in developing countries suffer from the lack of technically
capable personnel. Why do these engineers wish to work for the municipal government
of Baybay? Increased financial capability of the municipality as a result of
decentralization is again a part of the answer. The head of the MPDC Office told me
that his salary became adequate after the decentralization. The Municipal Engineering
Office was created in 1994 after the decentralization took place. Given that many poorer
neighboring municipalities cannot afford to create their own Engineering Offices, the
relative affluence of Baybay after decentralization is one important reason for capable
engineers to work in the municipality. My interviews with the heads of both Offices,
however, reveal that there is more to their incentives than monetary rewards.
The head of the MPDC Office was born and raised in a barangay near from the
Poblacion in Baybay. After he earned a civil engineering license, he worked in a private
construction company in Metro Manila, capital of the Philippines. When the current
mayor came into power in 1988, he came back to Baybay and began to work in the
municipal government. In 1991, he became the head of the MPDC Office. He told me
that working as the head of the MPDC Office in his hometown is much more interesting
than working as one employee of a construction company in Metro Manila. As the head
of the MPDC Office, he can be one of the very influential elite in the municipality.
Especially since the decentralization, the MPDC Office has planed and implemented
more and more capital investment projects. In his capacity as a planning director of the
municipality, he can make significant improvements in the municipality by providing
roads, water systems, a bus terminal, and so forth. Barangay councilors who want their
projects to be approved and private contractors who want to engage in projects
frequently lobby and depend on him. He also mentioned the pleasure of improving his
locality where he grew up. This is not possible if he works in a construction company in
Metro Manila. He said that, by working in the municipality, he can enjoy "the beauty of
being a planner."
The head of the Engineering Office was from a neighboring town, whereas his wife
was from Baybay. He started his career as a licensed engineer in the national
government's Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) in 1988. He worked
in DPWH's field office in Olmoc City, which was responsible for DPWH's projects in
Baybay and other neighboring towns. When DPWH created a new field office based in
Baybay and covering nine municipalities in 1991, he moved to this new office.
Throughout his career in DPWH, he was in charge of rural water projects. This
experience made him knowledgeable about rural water systems. He became the first
head of the Municipal Engineering Office of Baybay in 1994. Since then, he has been
highly appreciated by the rural barangays for his expertise and assistance in rural water
systems. When I interviewed him, he seemed to be very proud of telling me about what
he did in rural water systems in Baybay. As in the case of the head of MPDC Office, the
head of Engineering Office also enjoys being influential elite in this locality.
Heads of both MPDC and Engineering Offices had already had attachment to
Baybay before they assumed their positions. Baybay is a hometown for the head of
MPDC Office. It is not a hometown for the head of Engineering Office, but he had
already worked in this municipality for several years. For such persons with some sort
of attachment to the municipality, local prestige and influence are very attractive
incentives. The decentralization brought about new local prestige and influence to jobs
in the municipal government, which function as incentives for those who may otherwise
work outside the town to choose to work for the municipal government.
4.7. Is Rural Water in Baybay Unique?: Unanswered Questions
This chapter enumerates the conditions that enable the political institutions to work
and make good performance of the rural water systems possible in Baybay. Some of
these conditions seem to be similar, if not the same, in other municipalities in the
Philippines. Specifically, the decentralization policy has affected all local governments
throughout the country. My interviews with officials in some donor agencies and
national government departments,67 however, indicated that most other municipalities
fail to assume responsibilities for rural water systems. What accounts for the difference
between Baybay and other municipalities? This thesis cannot fully answer this question
because it deals only with Baybay. Systematic comparison of several municipalities is
necessary to answer the question. But it is still worthwhile examining possible
explanations from available information and proposing future research to address
unanswered questions.
The officials in donor agencies and the national government I interviewed attributed
the failure of other municipalities primarily to the lack of their financial and technical
capabilities. As discussed in 4.2, the municipal government of Baybay benefits from the
increased intergovernmental transfers much better than most other municipalities. As a
result, it was able to continually spend a sizable amount for rural water projects and to
create its Engineering Office. With regard to technical capabilities, abundant spring
water is also an advantage for Baybay. If it is necessary to drill deepwells, drilling rigs
are needed. Most municipalities including Baybay cannot afford such expensive
equipment." Given that the majority of rural residents in the Philippines relies on
67 These donor agencies are Asian Development Bank and Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund
(Japanese government agency). The national government agencies are Department of Public Works and
Highways, and Department of Interior and Local Government.
68 If shallower wells are enough to improve access to water for rural residents, municipalities (or residents)
are able to dig such wells.
groundwater (Table 4.1), many municipalities may not be able to assume responsibilities
69for rural water systems for this reason.
It should be noted here that the failure of most municipalities to assume
responsibilities for rural water systems does not mean that most rural communities have
no system. In fact, 70% of rural population in the Philippines already has access to
potable water (Table 2. 1).7o Most of these systems, predominantly wells (Table 4.1),
were constructed by the national Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) 71
and are maintained by rural barangays. Is maintenance performance in these barangays
different from those in Baybay? If so, why? It might be different if these barangays
adopt organizations other than barangay councils for maintenance. Even when
barangay councils maintain the systems as in the case of Baybay, organizational
structure of these councils might be different in other municipalities.7 3 Systematic
comparison among barangays in different municipalities, including both success and
failure, should be conducted to answer this question. Given that both success and failure
cases exist according to my interviewees in the national government and donor agencies,
69 Private contractors may drill deepwells for municipalities; however, such private contractors are not yet
developed in the Philippines according to my interviews.
70 This is the official figure for 1995 provided by the Philippine government; however, I am not sure the
accuracy of this figure. See notes for 3.1 in Chapter 3 for more discussion about the accuracy of figures
regarding access to water.
71 Its field offices are equipped with drilling rigs. For example, the field office located in Baybay, which
covers nine municipalities, has one drilling rig.
As a matter of policy, the Philippine national government requires the beneficiary barangays to form
community water boards, called Barangay Waterworks and Sanitation Associations (BWSAs) to undertake
O&M responsibilities, if the national government develop rural water facilities. The rural barangays in
Baybay do not form BWSAs because their systems are not assisted by the national government.
For example, barangays in other municipalities may not assign a particular councilor to water systems.
They also may have larger population than those in Baybay whereas the number of barangay councilors is
kept constant throughout all barangays.
it is worthwhile conducting such a comparative study to know more about what
organizational arrangements are likely to induce good performance in rural water
systems. This comparative study should cover different types of water systems, such as
natural gravity-fed systems, deepwells with hand pumps, and deepwells with electric
pumps, because different types of systems may have different impacts on the structure of
community organizations. Such a study may complement the finding from Baybay,
which is dominated by a single type of water system.
This research confines its scope only to rural water systems. How about the
performance of the barangay councils in Baybay in other public services, such as
primary health care, agricultural extension, and so forth? Are the political institutions
identified in this research functioning in other services as well? Particularly, the
organizational structure of the barangay councils might be workable in other services. It
is fruitful to conduct a comparative study of the performance of these barangay councils
across different public services to know more about successful community organizations
for the delivery of public services as general.74
Although my research was not structured to fully account for the difference between
Baybay and other municipalities," it was structured as cogently as possible within the
limited time frame to account for the encompassing mechanism and conditions for
74 Of course, the organizational arrangement of the rural barangay councils in Baybay may not function
well in other public services because different nature of other services may undermine good traits of the
councils. A comparative research of barangay councils across various public services can be used to learn
such different impacts of various services .
In the beginning of my field research, I intended to visit neighboring municipalities with poorer
performance to compare them with Baybay. After I realized, however, that it took time even to well
understand water systems only in Baybay, I chose to spend my limited time solely for the case of Baybay.
successful water systems throughout the rural barangays in Baybay. The following
chapter concludes this thesis by proposing a few policy implications emerging from this
detailed analysis of the case of Baybay.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION:
A FEW POLICY IMPLICATIONS
To conclude this research, I draw a few policy implications from the case of rural
water systems in Baybay. Although conditions peculiar to this locality, such as
abundance of clean spring water, contribute to the good performance, I generalize three
policy implications from this case. These policy implications concern both community-
based rural water projects specifically and decentralization of public administration
generally.
5.1. Organizational Structure for Community Water Boards
The first policy implication regards the organizational structure for rural
communities in drinking water projects. As a means to involve communities in water
projects, it is fairly common to organize community water boards.76 For these boards to
work well, their organizational structures should be arranged to induce representatives
on the boards to be accountable to community residents. The rural barangay councils in
Baybay give us a few lessons for such arrangements.
First, there must be a rewards and sanction mechanism clearly linked to the
performance of representatives. Being modeled on the barangay councils in Baybay, I
76 For an example in the Philippines, see note 72.
recommend the following arrangements for such a mechanism. Representatives on
community water boards should be popularly elected, instead of being appointed by a
higher agency, to allow community residents to replace poor performers. Election
should be held at large, instead of by districts, to make representatives accountable to all
community members. Each representative should be assigned a specific function to help
residents judge the performance of any single representative. For example,
representatives are respectively assigned to replacement of public faucets, cleaning of
reservoirs, repair of leakage in a different portion of the distribution network, or
maintenance of a different set of wells. Finally, adequate financial compensation should
be provided to representatives as an incentive for their reelection.
Second, there must be a communication channel through which beneficiaries can
immediately express their complaints about the water systems to representatives. In the
rural barangays in Baybay, the small size of communities and the closeness of barangay
councilors to residents contribute to this function. Following this arrangement in
Baybay, I recommend that the jurisdiction of each community water board should be
kept small enough to place water operators close to residents. Alternatively,
maintenance responsibilities of systems should be geographically divided into small
areas within which the assigned water operators are close enough to a small number of
residents.
The case of Baybay reveals that such arrangements can work in the absence of user
fees. Charging user fees is desirable in the rural water systems to attain financial
autonomy and sustainability, and to reduce economic inefficiency caused by tax finance.
But in practice, there are cases in which a user charge is not a feasible option, at least in
a short term. For example, it may be difficult to levy user fees when rural residents
believe that water facilities should be provided by the government for free." Even in
such a case, organizational arrangements, like the rural barangays in Baybay, can
stimulate good performance of water operators. User fees could be charged later when
they become feasible (e.g., when residents' ideas evolve to the point where they are
ready to pay for water systems). Of course, these organizational arrangements can be
adopted together with user fees from the beginning as well. In that case, both the
organizational arrangements and user fees reinforce each other to encourage
communities' informed decision making and to regulate water operators.
5.2. Role of Higher Levels of Government
The second policy implication concerns the role of higher levels of government in
decentralization.7' Recent literature on decentralization emphasizes that merely
transferring responsibilities from the national government to lower levels, such as local
governments, communities, or Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs),'79 does not
7 From several case studies, The World Bank Water Demand Research Team (1993) identifies that many
rural households in developing countries think that water should be provided by the government for free.
The Team regards such a sense of entitlement of rural residents as a significant obstacle to charge them.
The Team, however, also identifies that some rural households become skeptical about the government's
ability to deliver free water because the government failed to do so for a long time. From this finding, the
Team advocates that the residents' perception is changing (p. 58).
78, Higher levels of government" refer to the national government and other intermediate levels of
government collectively. In the Philippines, such intermediate levels are provincial governments.
Although the case of Baybay does not illuminate the role of the provincial government, I prefer to use
"higher levels of government" here for the purpose of generalization.
79 The term "decentralization" is often unsystematically used by many experts to mean different things;
however, Cohen and Peterson (1996) identify three common typologies in the literature written by English-
work well. The assistance and monitoring role of higher levels of government has
achieved growing attention (Dillinger 1995, Hommes 1996, Smoke 1993, Tendler 1997).
The finding from the case of Baybay confirms these emphases in the recent literature.
First, various forms of assistance from higher level governments are crucial for
local governments to undertake the decentralized responsibilities. Without the increased
intergovernmental transfers from the national government, Baybay could not have
expanded its rural water systems in such a significant way. The Baybay case further
indicates the necessity of greater assistance from higher levels of government to the
municipalities financially and technically less capable than Baybay. For such
municipalities, higher level governments should provide additional funding, either
through grants or loans, to enable them to finance rural water projects. 0 Higher levels of
government should also undertake engineering tasks that these municipalities are not
able to assume. Selective transfer of responsibilities to local governments can also be
arranged from the beginning as suggested in the recent literature on decentralization
(Smoke and Lewis 1996).81 In that case, responsibilities for rural water systems can be
transferred only to financially and technically capable municipalities while the
responsibilities for other municipalities are retained by the national government. The
speaking experts, namely devolution, deconcentration, and delegation. "Devolution" refers to the transfer
of responsibilities from the national government to local governments. "Deconcentration" means the
transfer from the headquarters of the national government to its local offices. "Delegation" is used for the
transfer to state owned enterprises, private sectors, communities, and NGOs. Because of the nature of the
case of rural water in Baybay, decentralization here concerns the transfer of responsibilities from the
national government to local governments and to communities.
80 At the time of my field visit, the Philippine government and donor agencies were planning to launch the
programs in which the national government assists less capable municipalities.
81 See note 63 in Smoke and Lewis (1996) for other literature advocating the benefits of selective and
retained responsibilities will be gradually transferred as the national government nurtures
financial and technical capabilities of less capable municipalities.
Second, higher levels of government can offset potentially undesirable actions by
the local elite. In Baybay, the provision of water systems to rural barangays includes a
politicized process, i.e. lobbying by barangay councils. This process potentially
disadvantages some barangays that do not support the incumbent mayor. Although long
stability of the ruling family in Baybay has mitigated such adverse effects by signaling
barangays whom they should support and lobby, more generally such adverse effects are
likely to be the rule rather than the exception. In such cases, higher levels of government
can counter the local elite's politicization of the provision of water systems. The
national government, for example, can provide grants for water systems to municipalities
with a condition that these grants should be spent only for the communities with access
to potable water under a certain level. By doing so, the national government can prevent
rural barangays from being left out of the water services for political reasons. 2
Third, the government's technical assistance is crucial for rural communities to
assume responsibilities for their water systems. 3 In the case of Baybay, the barangay
councils could not have developed and maintained their systems well if the municipal
incremental decentralization.
82 Tendler (1993) also points out the potential of higher levels of government to counter local elite's
interests which are against small farmers' interests by financing agricultural programs on condition that
they should include small farmers (p.1576).
83 The use of "the government," instead of "higher levels of government," here needs explanation. In the
context of the Philippines, the supporting role to communities is still the role of "higher levels of
government" because communities are regarded as the lowest tier of local governments. Communities,
however, are not necessarily regarded as local governments in other countries. For the purpose of
generalization, I distinguish communities from the government and refer to the supporting role of "the
technical staff had not given them adequate technical advice. The importance of
assistance from the government to rural communities is also suggested in the literature
on rural water projects (Briscoe and deFerrainti 1988, p. 16).84 It should be noted here,
however, that those who assist communities need not be municipal governments. Steffes
(1997), for example, finds in Ecuador that the national government agency with a wide
network of field offices, though already disbanded, was more capable than municipal
governments in assisting rural communities' maintenance of water systems. The
municipality of Baybay can assume the supporting role to communities because of its
technical capabilities. If municipalities, however, are unable to assume the supporting
role, higher levels of government, instead of municipalities, should undertake this role.
5.3. Enhancing Local Prestige
The third policy implication regards the role of local prestige and influence. 85 If
local governments suffer from the lack of technically capable personnel, the
decentralization does not work well. This is not a rare situation in developing countries.
The case of Baybay shows, however, that decentralization can be converted into
opportunities to attach new local prestige and influence to the municipal employees.
Such increased local prestige and influence can attract capable persons who have some
sort of attachment to the municipality but may otherwise work outside the town.
government" in general, instead of "higher levels of government."
84 Briscoe and deFerranti also propose the redirection of the role of government from direct providers to
facilitators (Briscoe and deFerranti 1988, p.2, pp.22-2 3 ).
85 Tendler and Freedheim (1994) highlight the strong worker commitment to the job, which was generated
by local prestige, as a key to the high performance of a rural preventive health program in the state of
Following the case of Baybay, I recommend that local governments, assuming wider
responsibilities as a result of decentralization, should recruit those who were locally
raised but are working outside the town or those who are locally based but are working
for more lucrative jobs, such as the national government and private sector. Local
prestige and influence are good incentives for such locally raised or based persons, and
they are likely to work conscientiously because of their attachment to the locality.
Ceari in Brazil. See also Tendler (1997).
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